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Abstract
We live in an age when our most private information is becoming exceedingly
difficult to keep private. Cryptology allows for the creation of encryptive barriers that
protect this information. Though the information is protected, it is not entirely inacces-
sible. A recipient may be able to access the information by decoding the message. This
possible threat has encouraged cryptologists to evolve and complicate their encrypting
methods so that future information can remain safe and become more difficult to decode.
There are various methods of encryption that demonstrate how cryptology continues to
evolve through time. These methods revolve around different areas of mathematics such
as arithmetic, number theory, and probability. Another concern that has brought cryp-
tology into everyday use and necessity is user authentication. How does one or a machine
know that a user is who they say they are? Living in the age where most of our infor-
mation is sent and accepted through computers, it is crucial that our information is kept
safe, and in the appropriate care.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In this paper we will analyze a few breakthroughs of cryptology, beginning from
the BC era to present day. The earliest development of cryptology stemmed from the need
to keep information safe while being sent between two recipients. This is still the primary
reason why cryptology is used today. The general process revolves around two actions:
disguising the original message a user wants to send and decoding a disguised message.
These actions are known as encryption and decryption, or deciphering. The disguised
form of the message is known as the cipher text. Throughout my project, I will introduce
and examine the methods of ciphering that I found most compelling. While introducing
each cipher, I will additionally provide historical information and significance.
Chapter 2 will introduce some of the first forms of encryption, starting with
simple substitution methods. These methods evolved with time as users needed more
secure ways of communicating. (Fortunately, as cryptology advances, cryptanalysts do as
well.) Affine ciphers provided a little more security by enciphering messages under more
than one operation. Near the early 1400s, it was time to develop a new means of ciphering,
where cipher texts were not as easy to decipher. Thus, the famous Vigene`re cipher was
born and was considered a breakthrough as one of the first polyalphabetic ciphers. Its
complexity is derived from being a composition of multiple substitution ciphers.
The Vigene`re cipher will be a prominent focal point in my thesis project. I will
explain in depth two methods commonly used for decrypting a text under this cipher, the
Kasiski and Friedman Tests. These two tests inspired all cryptologists alike by showing
that different areas of mathematics can be used in cryptology, not just simple algebra.
2(However, one’s underlying knowledge in number theory and probability help tremen-
dously.) The Kasiski Test deals with recurring strings of letters found in the cipher text,
giving us clues as to what the length of the keyword might be. (The keyword is a tool for
encryption.) The Friedman Test not only provides an estimate of the length of the key-
word, but also proves whether or not our cipher text is monoalphabetic or polyalphabetic,
which should always be the first question at hand.
When the earliest computers were created, it was much easier to use a binary
numeral system, a system in which information is solely expressed in combinations of 0s
and 1s, where each digit is referred to as a bit. The use of computers and this system
opened many doors for cryptologists. Creating ciphers and algorithms was just a click
away, and recreating it on paper was relatively easy once one knew what to do. Thus,
another method of enciphering was created using shift registers. Shift registers are able
to produce pseudorandom binary sequences, which are very useful in cryptography and
provide extra camouflage/security for a message. They work like miniature machines,
where the shift register, i.e., the machine, requires the most work to build. The section
on shift registers will provide a detailed example, with outlined steps on how our machine
is constructed and how it processes.
In Section 4.2 we will see that cryptology can be used for other purposes besides
encrypting messages or information. Continuing on the evolution of cryptography with
computers, one section will define and focus on message authentication codes (MAC) and
digital signatures. MAC and digital signatures deal with verification that a user is in fact
who they proclaim to be, a topic that we will revisit in the final sections of the thesis.
Public-Key Cryptosystems will also be introduced, as they are crucial to understand
before comprehending the final sections. This section, will prepare the reader for the
next which will cover significant breakthroughs in cryptology that are still used today.
Section 4.4 will introduce the reader to concepts and methods necessary to
comprehend before approaching the most famous algorithm pertaining to cryptology, the
RSA algorithm. We will discuss the derivation and significance of the algorithm, as well as
the founders and other protocols that the founders contributed to cryptology. Proofs will
be provided and outlined, and examples will be included that show that the algorithm does
indeed work and can be highly effective and secure if applied appropriately. One of the
first commercial applications of the RSA algorithm that will be examined is key exchange,
3which consists of deriving a mutual key between sender and receiver by using values that
they initially choose. We will primarily focus on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme.
The last cryptosystem that will be discussed is the knapsack cryptosystem. In Section 4.5
we will present one method of attack on this cryptosystem, showing that any information
being sent through this system is not secure. We will conclude the project with a chapter
that gives an overview of current cryptology and how crucial it is that the world of
cryptology continues to evolve.
4Chapter 2
The First Ciphers
2.1 Monoalphabetic Ciphers: The Caesar and Affine Ci-
phers
Monoalphabetic ciphers are defined by each letter in the alphabet being mapped
to exactly one other letter during the encryption process. These types of ciphers are
sometimes called substitution ciphers. One of the most famous and earliest monoalpha-
betic ciphers was the Caesar cipher, which consists of shifting the letters in the alphabet.
Thus, there are a total of 26 possible additive shifts [Beu94].
Example 2.1.1. Encrypting a message with an additive shift of 3: By letting the letters
of the English alphabet correspond to the numbers 0, 1, ..., 25, we get A = 0, B = 1, ...,
Z = 25. To encrypt our given cleartext/message with a shift of 3, one would add 3 to
each number that represents the letters in the given cleartext.
For example, since A = 0, encrypting A from cleartext to ciphertext would give
D, since D= 3 and 0+3 = 3. Using the same additive shift of 3, C, which is 2 in cleartext,
would translate to F in ciphertext, since F corresponds to 5.
A cipher that is a bit more complex, requiring multiplication as well as addition,
is the affine cipher. An affine cipher can be represented in the form,
ax+ b (mod 26),
where a is the multiplicative shift, b is the additive shift, and x is the number representing
the letter in cleartext that one is encrypting. There are only 12 possible multiplicative
5shifts: a must be an element of the set {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25}. This set
consists of numbers inclusively between 1 and 26 that are relatively prime to 26. One is
able to perform multiplicative shifts from the above set because each element of this set
has a multiplicative inverse a−1, considered modulo 26, such that aa−1 ≡ 1 (mod 26).
This is a necessary condition for a one-to-one mapping, or in this case, for the affine cipher
to be monoalphabetic. This condition of having a multiplicative inverse also allows us to
decipher the text. The following table shows the set of positive integers smaller than and
relatively prime to 26, with their inverses.
possible a’s 1 3 5 7 9 11 15 17 19 21 23 25
a−1 1 9 21 15 3 19 7 23 11 5 17 25
It is also worth noting that affine ciphers provide significantly more security than
Caesar ciphers alone. Since there are a total of 26 additive ciphers, and 12 possible
multiplicative ciphers, there are a total of 26 · 12 = 312 possible affine ciphers.
In the following formula, and throughout this paper, we will frequently have
need to refer to residues in a modular congruence class. In such cases we will use the
notation x = y mod n to mean x equals the least nonnegative residue y (mod n).
To decrypt a given ciphertext with a known [a, b] is a matter of substituting a−1
and b into the formula:
p = a−1(c− b) mod 26,
where c is the number corresponding to a letter in ciphertext, and p is the desired number
that corresponds to a letter in cleartext.
Example 2.1.2. Ciphertext: HGGVUB and [a, b]= [5,7].
HGGVUB 7 6 6 21 20 1
a−1(c− b) mod 26 = p 21(7-7) = 0 21(6− 7) mod 26 = 5 5 21(21− 7) mod 26 = 8 21(20− 7) mod 26 = 13 21(1− 7) mod 26 = 4
Cleartext A F F I N E
If [a, b] is not known, then frequency analysis may be used to assist us in de-
crypting a given ciphertext.
62.2 Decryption Using Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis in cryptology is the process of analyzing the frequencies in
the letters in ciphertext and making the assumption that the letter that appears most
frequently maps from the letter that has the highest frequency in an English text: the
letter E. (See Table 2.1 [Beu94].)
letter relative frequency(%) letter relative frequency(%)
a 8.167 n 6.749
b 1.492 o 7.507
c 2.782 p 1.929
d 4.253 q 0.095
e 12.702 r 5.987
f 2.228 s 6.327
g 2.015 t 9.056
h 6.094 u 2.758
i 6.966 v 0.978
j 0.153 w 2.360
k 0.772 x 0.150
l 4.025 y 1.974
m 2.406 z 0.074
Table 2.1: Frequency Distribution of all 26 Letters in English Text
One can conclude that this approach is more accurate if the ciphertext is rea-
sonably large so that it makes sense to consider frequency among letters. Assuming that
the most frequent letter in the ciphertext maps from E, if the ciphertext was encrypted
using a Caesar cipher, we can count the additive shift used in the cipher from E to the
letter we believe maps from E. Thus, we can reverse this shift on all the other letters in
the ciphertext to see if one has a coherent message. If an affine cipher was used, one can
still use frequency analysis to determine both shifts, a and b.
Example 2.2.1.
Given a text encrypted with an affine cipher:
7JZQ DQN IQY UXQRC JZQ CZQN ERN JZQ HLMQ IQY UXQRC JZQ
HEKI NUUD
By frequency analysis, the letter that appears the most in our ciphertext is Q.
We may assume that Q maps from E. Since Q = 16 and E = 4, to find our a and b, we
set up the mapping equation from E to Q:
4a+ b (mod 26) ≡ 16.
Now, as stated earlier, amust be an element of the set {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25}.
So let us first assume that a = 3:
4(3) + b = 16
12 + b = 16
b = 4.
This gives us a plausible combination of [a, b] to test. Putting [3,4] and each letter in our
ciphertext into p = a−1(c− b), we get a coherent message:
THE RED KEY OPENS THE SHED AND THE BLUE KEY OPENS THE
BACK DOOR
If a = 3 had not worked, the next reasonable choice would be to test a = 5, and so on. If
a = 1, then the cipher would have been encrypted by a simple substitution cipher. This
method of trying all possibilities is called a brute force attack. A brute force attack of
trying all possible a’s would take only about 10 attempts.
Frequency analysis will continue to be a valuable tool for decryption in the next
chapter, as we discuss one of the first known polyalphabetic ciphers, the Vigene`re Cipher.
8Chapter 3
Polyalphabetic Ciphers and The
Vigene`re Cipher
“[Enciphered writing] must not rely upon secrecy, and it must be able to fall into the
enemy’s hands without disadvantage.”
-Auguste Kerckhoff, La Cryptographie Militaire, 1883.
3.1 The Vigene`re Cipher
The Vigene`re cipher was a significant breakthrough for early 16th century cryp-
tology. Prior to this discovery, cryptologists were having difficulty keeping messages
secure and undecodable. Since frequency analysis had become a popular code breaking
strategy, monoalphabetic ciphers were becoming less of an issue for all cryptanalysts alike,
and a new method of ciphering was sought. This led several cryptography enthusiasts
to attempt to produce a new cipher where it was possible for two different letters in
cleartext to become the same letter in ciphertext through the encryption process. From
their efforts, French diplomat Blaise de Vigene`re was inspired to devise the new cipher
fitting that which the enthusiasts had in mind [Beu94]. Thus the cipher was coined the
“Vigene`re cipher,” and the table that breaks down the cipher that can be used as a tool
for encryption and decryption was coined the “Vigene`re square.” (See Figure 3.1.)
9A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
A A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
B B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A
C C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B
D D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
E E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D
F F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E
G G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F
H H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G
I I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H
J J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I
K K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J
L L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K
M M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L
N N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M
O O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
P P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
Q Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
R R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
S S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
T T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
U U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
V V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
W W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
X X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
Y Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
Z Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y
Figure 3.1: The Vigene`re Square
The square in Figure 3.1 [Beu94] displays all of the possible monoalphabetic
ciphers/shifts. In comparison with Caesar ciphers, messages encrypted with Vigene`re
ciphers are exceedingly more secure. Within a Caesar cipher, for example, if the letter
A is encrypted as the letter Y, then it is impossible for another letter to be encrypted
as Y. This is not the case with Vigene`re ciphers, or any other polyalphabetic cipher. In
Vigene`re ciphers, each letter in the ciphertext has 26 possible outcomes when decrypted,
depending on the keyword that is used during encryption. As with affine ciphers, knowing
the different shifts used from each letter in the keyword helps when decrypting a Vigene`re
cipher, and is essential when encrypting each letter in a message.
Example 3.1.1.
Let our cleartext be:
THERESTROUBLECLOSEBY
and our keyword be:
10
LEAVE
Let n denote the length of the keyword. In this case n = 5. We will then proceed with
encryption by writing out the keyword directly under the first 5 letters of our cleartext,
and continue writing it underneath until the string of our repeated keyword is equivalent
in length to our cleartext:
T H E R E S T R O U B L E C L O S E B Y
L E A V E L E A V E L E A V E L E A V E
In order to obtain the ciphertext, the next step is to convert all letters to their corre-
sponding assigned number, 0 to 25, as visible in the previous chapter:
19 7 4 17 4 18 19 17 14 20 1 11 4 2 11 14 18 4 1 24
11 4 0 21 4 11 4 0 21 4 11 4 0 21 4 11 4 0 21 4
The following step is to add the numbers in each column and compute each sum
(mod 26). Doing this for each column will give the ciphertext in numerical form.
Converting these sums to letters will give us the desired final ciphertext. For example,
the first entry would be (19 + 11) mod 26 = 4, so the first letter would be E. Thus the
complete ciphertext would be:
ELEMIDXRJYMPEXPZWEWC
If the keyword is known to both parties, then decrypting the ciphertext is only a matter
of reversing the number of shifts used for each letter. If the keyword is not known, then
the first task at hand would be to find the length of the keyword.
3.2 The Kasiski Test
One method of possibly finding the length of the keyword is the Kasiski test. The
Kasiski test was first published by Prussian colonel and cryptologist Friedrich Wilhelm
Kasiski in 1863. However, it is known that the earliest discovery of this particular method
is credited to mathematician and inventor Charles Babbage. Babbage first thought of
11
the method of finding regularities and patterns in ciphertext while studying the cipher
in the mid-1840s. His first successful attack using this method was made in the 1850s
during the Crimean War, however, the method was kept as a military secret by British
Intelligence. Despite not being publicly credited for this particular discovery, Babbage
continued to invent and is most famous for his work in designing mechanical calculators
[Sta10].
The Kasiski test consists of 3 steps: finding repeated strings of letters in a
ciphertext, finding the distances between these sequences, and calculating the common
divisors of the distances between all sequences [Beu94]. One of these common divisors is
suggested to be the length of the keyword. The best way to see why this method works
is through a particularly (short) example where the method might be of use.
Example 3.2.1.
Let our cleartext be:
THECATSEESTHECATNEXTDOOR
and our keyword be:
WATER
In this example, the string THECAT is repeated twice in the cleartext. When strings of
letters or words are repeated in the cleatext, the Kasiski test is more effective since the
possibility of seeing a repeated sequence of letters in the ciphertext increases. We can
also presume that the larger the ciphertext, the greater the possibility that repeated
sequences are likely to occur. This is because there are words in English that occur
regularly in text, e.g., THE, AND and THAT [Beu94]. Encrypting our cleartext from
Example 3.1.1, we get:
T H E C A T S E E S T H E C A T N E X T D O O R
W A T E R W A T E R W A T E R W A T E R W A T E
19 7 4 2 0 19 18 4 4 18 19 7 4 2 0 19 13 4 23 19 3 14 14 17
22 0 19 4 17 22 0 19 4 17 22 0 19 4 17 22 0 19 4 17 22 0 19 4
Computing the sums of each column, modulo 26, and converting our numbers back to
letters, we get our ciphertext:
12
PHXGRPSXIJPHXGRPNXBKZOHV
We see that the only repeated sequence is PHXGRP, and the distance, or the number
of letters, between each set is 10, with prime factors of 2 and 5. So, by the Kasiski test,
the length of the keyword is suggested to be 2, 5 or 10. Note that 5 is the length of the
keyword in our example.
After finding the length n of the keyword, we can complete the deciphering process by
analyzing the frequencies of letters in our ciphertext. If we separate the ciphertext in
groups of n, we know that the first letter in each group of n must come from the same
column in the Vigene`re square because the same shift was used for those letters.
Using the example from above:
PHXGR PSXIJ PHXGR PNXBK ZOHV
We begin by applying frequency analysis for the first letters of every group. Therefore,
we consider the set: {P, P, P, P, Z}. We first assume the letter that appears most
frequently corresponds to E in the original message, revealing what shift might have
been used and thus giving us the first letter of the keyword. So we assume that P
corresponds to the letter E in cleartext. We subtract the numbers that represent P and
E and reduce modulo 26: (15− 4) mod 26 = 11. Since 11 corresponds to the letter L,
we assume that the first letter of the keyword is L. To continue this process, frequency
analysis would be applied to the second letter of each group, then the third, until we
reach the nth letter of each group. If at any point the deciphered message clearly
becomes incomprehensible, we try to determine which letter of the key may have been
derived incorrectly, and start over from that location using the letter with the next
highest relative frequency from Table 2.1. In this example, we would start over from the
beginning, and assume that P corresponds to the letter T in cleartext. Subtracting P
and T , we get (15− 19) mod 26 = 22. Thus, our next assumption would be that the
first letter of the keyword is W , which, in this case, it is! We continue by assuming that
the most frequent letter in the second set of letters corresponds to E in plaintext, and
repeat the process of trying to find a coherent keyword.
This process becomes more reliable and accurate as the ciphertext grows larger
and the keyword stays relatively short in length, perhaps of length 8 or less.
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3.3 Index of Coincidence and The Friedman Test
One significant contributor to the US government’s cryptographic efforts was
William Friedman. During World War I, Friedman worked with the US government
and led courses that consisted of training prospective cryptanalysts. His cryptological
methods became classics in cryptology history, making Friedman an important figure in
the early NSA (National Security Agency) [Lev01].
In order to proceed to the next method of solving the Vigene`re cipher, the
Friedman test, we must first introduce the Index of Coincidence (IOC), a technique
also developed by William F. Friedman. The IOC represents the probability that, after
selecting a pair of letters from a text, the two letters are the same.
Derivation of the Index of Coincidence [Beu94]:
Consider an arbitrary sequence of letters of length n, n ≥ 2. Let n1 denote the number
of a’s, n2 the number of b’s, ... , n26 the number of z ’s. We are interested in how often
a randomly selected pair of letters would both be a.
There are n1 ways to choose the first a. There are n1 − 1 possibilities for choosing the
second a. Since we neglect the order of the letters in the pair, the number of pairs of a’s
equals:
n1(n1 − 1)
2
.
Therefore, the total number of pairs that consist of equal letters (that is both a, or both
b, ..., or both z ) equals:
n1(n1 − 1)
2
+
n2(n2 − 1)
2
+ · · ·+ n26(n26 − 1)
2
=
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1)
2
. (3.1)
We compute the probability of choosing a pair of equal letters at random by dividing
Formula (3.1) by the number of all possible cases:
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1)/2
n(n− 1)/2 =
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1)
n(n− 1)
14
Thus we have,
I =
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1)
n(n− 1) , (3.2)
where 0 ≤ I ≤ 1.
Another representation of the IOC is:
p1 · p1 + p2 · p2 + · · ·+ p26 · p26 =
26∑
i=1
p2i ,
where pi · pi is the probability that two chosen letters in the text will be the same letter.
For the English language, the IOC is:
26∑
i=1
p2i ≈ 0.065.
By this calculation, one can determine if a monoalphabetic or polyalphabetic
cipher was used by comparing the IOC to 0.065. If a ciphertext has an IOC close to 0.065,
it is likely that the text was encrypted with a monoalphabetic cipher. On the other hand,
if the text was encrypted using a polyalphabetic cipher, each letter theoretically occurs
with the same probability of
1
26
. In this case the IOC would be estimated at:
26∑
i=1
p2i =
26∑
i=1
1
262
= 26 · 1
262
=
1
26
≈ 0.038. (3.3)
The Index of Coincidence can also assist us in finding the length of our keyword
and is a shorter process than the Kasiski test. The formula to find the length of a keyword
is
l =
0.027n
(n− 1)I − 0.038n+ 0.065 , (3.4)
where l is the length of the keyword, I is the calculated IOC of the ciphertext, and n is
the number of letters in our ciphertext.
Before we derive Formula (3.4), we must first visualize what exactly the length
of a keyword does: it divides our ciphertext into groups of length l. If l is known, we can
15
organize our ciphertext into l columns, such that the first letter in every group of length
l belongs in one column, the second letter of each group belongs in the second column,
and so on. If we organize the ciphertext from Example 3.1.1 in this manner, knowing
that the length of the keyword is 5, the ciphertext would look like this:
P H X G R
P S X I J
P H X G R
P N X B K
Z O H V
Note that there are the same number of rows as groups of l’s; this will always
be true. Since we are now able to visualize a ciphertext divided into columns, we may
begin the steps to derive the formula used to find the length of the keyword.
Steps for the derivation of Formula (3.4) [Beu94]:
We start by deriving how many pairs of letters must be in each column. Let n
denote the number of letters in the ciphertext. Then each column has n/l letters. There
are exactly n possibilities for a randomly chosen letter. In the column the chosen letter
is located, there are exactly n/l − 1 other letters. Thus there are n/l − 1 ways to choose
the second letter from the same column, and the number of pairs of letters that are in
the same column equals
n ·
(n
l
− 1
)
2
=
n(n− l)
2l
. (3.5)
Since there are exactly n− n/l letters outside the chosen letter’s column, the number of
pairs of letters that are in different columns equals
n ·
(
n− n
l
)
2
=
n2(l − 1)
2l
. (3.6)
Now, recall that the English language has an IOC of 0.065 and a completely jumbled
text, where every letter occurs with the same probability, has an IOC of approximately
0.038 (by Formula 3.3). Combining these IOCs with our observations, we see that the
expected number, A, of pairs of equal letters is
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A =
n(n− l)
2l
· 0.065 + n
2(l − 1)
2l
· 0.038. (3.7)
Therefore, the probability that a pair of letters chosen at random are the same letter
equals
A
n(n− 1)/2 =
n− l
l(n− 1) · 0.065 +
n(l − 1)
l(n− 1) · 0.038
=
1
l(n− 1) · [0.027n+ l(0.038n− 0.065)].
Since the IOC approximately equals the above probability, we obtain
I ≈ 0.027n
l(n− 1) +
0.038n− 0.065
n− 1 . (3.8)
Solving for our variable l, we finally obtain the desired formula by Friedman,
l =
0.027n
(n− 1)I − 0.038n+ 0.065 . (3.9)
To apply Formula (3.9), we first determine the length n of the text and the
frequencies, n1, . . . , n26, among the letters. We next substitute these values into Formula
(3.2) to obtain I. Lastly, we substitute the values I and n into Formula (3.9) to obtain
an estimate of the length of the keyword.
Example 3.3.1. In the following table [Bar02], we have the counts ni of the various
letters in a given ciphertext:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
3 2 7 2 4 1 8 9 10 5 5 5 11
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
5 5 5 3 8 8 12 2 8 9 13 1 1
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The total number of letters is n = 152, and
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1) = 3 · 2 + 2 · 1 + 7 · 6 + · · ·+ 13 · 12 + 1 · 0 + 1 · 0 = 1048.
Thus the IOC is
I =
26∑
i=1
ni(ni − 1)
n(n− 1) =
1048
152 · 151 ≈ 0.0457.
Since I is not estimated at about 0.065, it is likely that we were given a text enciphered
with a polyalphabetic cipher. By putting n and I into the formula for deriving l (3.9),
we get
l =
0.027(152)
(152− 1)0.0457− 0.038(152) + 0.065 =
4.104
1.1897
≈ 3.45,
suggesting that the length of the keyword must be the next whole number, 4. After
obtaining the length of the keyword, one can apply the same steps used in Section 3.1 to
find the shifts/letters of our keyword.
3.4 Other Classical Ciphers
A cipher that inspired many other cryptological ideas is the Hill Cipher, some-
times known as Hill’s System. This cipher was invented by mathematician and educator
Lester S. Hill in 1929. Hill served as a lieutenant in the US Navy in World War I, and
continued to invest time and send suggestions regarding cryptological techniques to naval
communications until retiring in 1960 [Kah67].
The Hill Cipher was one of the first known polygraphic ciphers, a cipher in which
it is possible to operate on large groups of symbols at once. Like the Vigene`re Cipher,
the Hill Cipher requires a key for both encryption and decryption. Unlike the Vigene`re
cipher, this key is in the form of a matrix.
The key for this cipher will be in the form of a 2 × 2 matrix, consisting of
the elements a, b, c, and d, such that these elements are in Z26. We then allow pk and
pk+1 to be two characters in the kth and (k + 1)st positions of our plaintext message.
Two ciphertext characters in corresponding positions, ck and ck+1, will be enciphered
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by multiplying our key matrix by our two plaintext letters as a 2 × 1 matrix as shown
[Lew00]:
For k an integer,  ck
ck+1
 =
a b
c d
 pk
pk+1
 mod 26.
To decrypt a given ciphertext while knowing the key matrix, we simply put each pair of
ciphertext characters into the equation pi
pi+1
 =
a b
c d
−1 ci
ci+1
 mod 26.
A classical cipher that one might glimpse in the morning paper, widely known as
an anagram, is the transposition cipher (or permutation cipher). A transposition cipher
consists of rearranging the positions of the elements of the message without changing the
identities of the elements [Mao04]. The German ADFGVX cipher (a cipher used during
World War I), is a transposition cipher that consists of substitutions as well. Though
it was considered to be difficult to crack at the time, the cipher was broken by French
cryptanalyst Georges Painvin [Sch94].
We present one example of a transposition cipher as follows [Mao04]:
Example 3.4.1. Consider that the elements of a plaintext message P are numbers in
Z26. Let b be a fixed positive integer representing the size/length of a message, let C
be our ciphertext so that P = C = (Z26)b, and let k (our key) be all permutations,
i.e., rearrangements of (1, 2, . . . , b). Let pi ∈ k, for a permutation pi, such that pi =
(pi(1), pi(2), ..., pi(b)). For a plaintext string (x1, x2, ...xb) ∈ P , the encryption algorithm
of this transposition cipher is
epi(x1, x2, ..., xb) =
(
xpi(1), xpi(2), ..., xpi(b)
)
.
Let pi−1 denote the inverse of pi, i.e., pi−1(pi(i)) = i for i = 1, 2, ..., b. Then the corre-
sponding decryption algorithm of the transposition cipher is
dpi = (y1, y2, ..., yb) =
(
ypi−1(1), ypi−1(2), ..., ypi−1(b)
)
.
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If the message is larger in length than b, the message is divided into multiple strings and
the same procedures are repeated for each string.
Let b = 4 and pi = (pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), pi(4)) = (2, 4, 1, 3). Then the plaintext message
proceed meeting as agreed
is first divided into 6 strings consisting of 4 letters each:
proc eedm eeti ngas agre ed
Looking at the first string, proc, and at pi, we see that the letter in the first position
will shift to the third position, and the letter in the second position will shift to the first
position, etc. Applying pi to each group of four, we get the following ciphertext:
rcpoemedeietgsnagearde
(We delete the underscores at the end of our ciphertext to avoid giving information about
our key.) The decryption key for deriving the original message is:
pi−1 =
(
pi(1)−1, pi(2)−1, pi(3)−1, pi(4)−1
)
=
(
2−1, 4−1, 1−1, 3−1
)
= (1, 2, 3, 4).
One can deduce that for a message of length b, there are b! different keys. There-
fore, a plaintext message string can be enciphered to b! possible ciphertexts. However,
one should know that this cipher can be easily decrypted since the identities of the letters
do not change. One is able to apply frequency analysis since the characters hold the same
frequencies shown in Table 2.1.
A cipher that is very similar to the Vigene`re Cipher is the Beaufort Cipher
which was developed by Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, R.N. [Kah67]. The Beaufort
Cipher enciphers text by subtracting the number corresponding to a plaintext letter from
the number corresponding to a letter in our keyword. Many know of this cipher as the
Vigene`re cipher applied backwards. The difference will be computed modulo 26 and will
be converted to its corresponding letter, thus completing the encryption process.
Example 3.4.2. Encrypting a message with the Beaufort Cipher
Keyword W A R W A R W A R W A R
Plaintext H O L D Y O U R F I R E
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Keyword 22 0 17 22 0 17 22 0 17 22 0 17
Plaintext 7 14 11 3 24 14 20 17 5 8 17 4
Computing the difference of each column modulo 26, and converting our numbers back
to letters, we get our ciphertext:
PMGTCDCJMOJN
The decryption process of this cipher relies on using the Vigene`re square, the
same square used in a Vigene`re cipher. Simply take a letter of position k in a ciphertext,
go down that letter’s column beginning on the first row and stopping at the kth letter of
the keyword, and move left to see which letter is in front of that row. This letter is in
the k position in our cleartext message.
David Kahn presents a third cipher in his text, The Codebreakers [Kah67]. This
cipher can be applied using the Vigene`re square, known as the Variant Cipher, sometimes
referred to as the Variant Beaufort Cipher. Kahn shows the differences between all three
ciphers (using the notation P for plain, K for key, and C for cipher) [Kah67]:
enciphering deciphering
Vigene`re P +K = C C −K = P
Variant P −K = C C +K = P
Beaufort K − P = C K − C = P
Though classical ciphers played an important role in history, they are of very
little use in today’s ever-evolving world of technology and computers. It once took a
small ciphering machine hours to encipher a secret message. Today there are computers
that are able to generate thousands of random numbers in a matter of seconds. There are
also computers that can generate very nice prime numbers and have proven to be very
useful in cryptology. The next chapter holds the turning point of cryptology itself—the
building blocks of public-key cryptosystems.
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Chapter 4
Cryptology and Computers
“Systems are organic, living creations: if people stop working on them and improving
them, they die.”
-Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, 1984.
4.1 Shift Registers and Pseudorandom Sequences
As cryptologists depended more on machines to ease the monotonous task of
encryption and decryption, changes were made in terms of representing the English al-
phabet. Converting each letter to a sequence of bits, 0’s and 1’s, made ciphering more
efficient through means of computers, and also consolidated the number of operations
used during encryption. American Standard Code for Information Interchange, com-
monly known as ASCII, translated the English alphabet into bits and was the universal
language between the first computers. (Table 4.1 shows some ASCII binary representa-
tions [Beu94].)
The single operation used to encrypt and decrypt follows [Beu94]: Let a1, a2, ..., ai
be bits from a given cleartext/message, and k1, k2, ..., ki be bits from our known key. Then
our ciphertext is obtained from a1 ⊕ k1, a2 ⊕ k2,...,ai ⊕ ki, where ⊕ represents bitwise
addition modulo 2. So,
1⊕ 1 = 0⊕ 0 = 0 and 1⊕ 0 = 0⊕ 1 = 1.
For additional security, cryptologists prefer the key to be derived from a pseu-
dorandom sequence. These sequences may be generated by shift registers. Shift registers,
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ASCII character binary representation ASCII character binary representation
A 01000001 N 01001110
B 01000010 O 01001111
C 01000011 P 01010000
D 01000100 Q 01010001
E 01000101 R 01010010
F 01000110 S 01010011
G 01000111 T 01010100
H 01001000 U 01010101
I 01001001 v 01010110
J 01001010 W 01010111
K 01001011 X 01011000
L 01001100 Y 01011001
M 01001101 Z 01011010
Table 4.1: Some ASCII Binary Representations
for cryptological purposes, are represented as cells that each hold one bit. Example 4.1.1
shows a shift register of length 5, however, shift registers can range from 2 to hundreds
of cells in length.
Example 4.1.1. A shift register of length 5
If we put an initial sequence of bits into this particular shift register, for example, 10001,
after 5 shifts we return to the initial state of the sequence.
1 0 0 0 1
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cells 5 4 3 2 1
initial state 1 0 0 0 1
after 1st shift 1 1 0 0 0
after 2nd shift 0 1 1 0 0
after 3rd shift 0 0 1 1 0
after 4th shift 0 0 0 1 1
after 5th shift 1 0 0 0 1
The initial state is chosen by the user and can be any combination of 0’s and
1’s except the zero state, which is a string of only 0’s. This is because the zero state is
permanent and each shift will produce only another sequence of 0’s. The key consists only
of bits that are being outputted from the first (far right) cell with each shift. Therefore
the key using this particular shift register with the initial state of 10001 would be 10001,
and may be repeated if the cleartext is longer than the key. Coincidentally, from the
example above, the output happens to be the same as the initial state of the bits inserted
into the shift register. This will not always be the case, and one will not always obtain
such a short key with which to work. For example, an initial state of 11010 would produce
the key 01011 using the above shift register.
Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) are a little more complex as they make
it more difficult to detect a pattern in a sequence. They are also more likely to supply a
longer key than an average shift register. Unlike Example 4.1.1, LFSR allow the last cell
to receive input from more than one cell. This value, which is fed back into the last cell,
is called the feedback.
Example 4.1.2. Linear feedback shift register of length 4
⊕
If we input in an initial sequence of 1001, the sequences that follow would be:
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cells 4 3 2 1
initial state 1 0 0 1
after 1st shift 1 1 0 0
after 2nd shift 0 1 1 0
after 3rd shift 1 0 1 1
after 4th shift 0 1 0 1
after 5th shift 1 0 1 0
after 6th shift 1 1 0 1
after 7th shift 1 1 1 0
after 8th shift 1 1 1 1
after 9th shift 0 1 1 1
after 10th shift 0 0 1 1
after 11th shift 0 0 0 1
after 12th shift 1 0 0 0
after 13th shift 0 1 0 0
after 14th shift 0 0 1 0
after 15th shift 1 0 0 1
The repeating output/key may now be read off the right-most column:
100110101111000. . ..
Because these pseudorandom sequences are finite, there is a limit to how many
bits can be in a single cycle. The maximum length of every cycle is 2n − 1, where n is
the number of bits in the initial sequence. We subtract 1 from 2n possible combinations
of 0’s and 1’s because the zero state cannot be produced unless we had started with
the zero state as our initial sequence; therefore, we exclude this combination. So when
considering the LFSR in the previous example, since the initial sequence had n = 4
bits, the corresponding cycle could not have consisted of more than 15 bits. Since this
particular LFSR yields a cycle of maximal length, it is considered to be a maximal LFSR.
Another way to represent a unique LFSR is through polynomials, defined as
characteristic polynomials. The characteristic polynomial of an LFSR is derived from the
taps of the LFSR, which are the positions of the LFSR that influence the next state of
the sequence. A characteristic polynomial that represents an LFSR that outputs a cycle
of maximal length is called a primitive polynomial.
Positions of the cells are considered when obtaining the characteristic polynomial
and are ordered differently than the cell number. Though cell 1 is the rightmost cell,
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the cell in the first position would be the leftmost cell. Therefore, the characteristic
polynomial (that is also a primitive polynomial) for Example 4.1.2 would be 1 + x3 + x4,
since the third and fourth positions of the LFSR influence the bit in the first position in
the upcoming shift. If we look at the sequences of the 15 shifts above, after the 1st shift,
Cell 4 holds 1 because this is the sum of Cell 2 and Cell 1 from the previous state. The
bits that were in Cells 4, 3, and 2 in the initial state have moved one cell over after the
1st shift and now reside in Cells 3, 2, and 1, respectively. (One can find a list of primitive
polynomials modulo 2 in [Sch94].)
One method for deriving the characteristic polynomial of a given sequence starts
with first considering the possibilities of the length of the shift register. We know that
for any LFSR of length n, the period cannot exceed 2n − 1. So, if we let p be the period
of a given sequence, then 2n − 1 ≥ p. This necessary condition helps us eliminate some
possibilities for n. Once we reach a possible n, we can use the method in the following
example to see if this n is suitable to determine a possible characteristic polynomial.
Example 4.1.3. Deriving a Characteristic Polynomial
Given the output sequence 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, with a period of 8, find the characteristic
polynomial with the lowest possible degree.
Since 2n − 1 ≥ 8, we see n 6= 2 and n 6= 3. We first check if n = 4. The given
output sequence contains the bits from all the shifts that are positioned in the last cell:
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
Since every shift contains 3 consecutive bits that were in consecutive positions in the
previous shift, we can input the missing cells by backtracking the bits from the bottom
to the top:
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11 011 1011
01 101 0101
10 010 0010
01 001 1001
00 100 0100
10 010 010
01 01 01
0 0 0
Let us consider the bits in the first five shifts. We know the characteristic
polynomial represents cells that influence the left-most cell in the next shift. Since the
bit in the left-most cell in the second shift is 0, we can test sums of cells in the first shift
to see what gives us 0.
Consider the first two shifts:
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
Let c1, c2, c3, and c4 represent the bits in the first shift. Then c1⊕c3 = c1⊕c4 = c3⊕c4 = 0
and c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c4 = c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 = 0. We next attempt these combinations
on the bits in the second shift to see if we get the bits in the third.
Consider the second and third shifts:
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
We now let c1, c2, c3,and c4 represent the bits in the second shift and look for a combination
of cells to get a binary sum of 0. The only possible combinations using those from above
are c1 ⊕ c3, c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4, and c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c4. We try the third and fourth shifts with the
remaining three combinations:
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0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
The only sums that equal 1 are c1⊕c3 and c2⊕c3⊕c4. Finally, we see that the remaining
two combinations do not satisfy the bits in the next two shifts:
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
Both c1 ⊕ c3 6= 0 and c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 6= 0. Therefore, n 6= 4.
We next use the same backtracking method for the case n = 5 and obtain the
following sequences:
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1
0
Let c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5 represent the bits in the first shift:
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
The possible combinations of cells to get 0 are:
c2 ⊕ c4 = c2 ⊕ c5 = c4 ⊕ c5 = c1 ⊕ c3 = 0,
c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c4 = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c5 = c1 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 = 0, and
c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c5 = c1 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 = 0.
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Following the same method as before, and reducing the possible combinations, we find
the remaining combination c1 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 satisfies all shifts and gives us the appropriate
output sequence. This confirms that n = 5 and the LFSR with its initial sequence looks
like:
1 0 1 1 0
⊕
The characteristic polynomial of this LFSR is 1 + x+ x4 + x5.
Though a maximal LFSR provides some security, to ensure its full efficiency,
the period should also be reasonably long. A longer period and/or cycle strengthens the
defense against an attack on a ciphertext, but additional precautions may be carried out.
One can implement an additional LFSR where outputs of both LFSRs are combined.
Another possibility would be to use an additional LFSR to control the output from the
first LFSR. A method of using two LFSRs in such a way is known as the Shrinking Gen-
erator. The shrinking generator method was published in 1993 by Don Coppersmith,
Hugo Krawczyk, and Yishay Mansour. These three IBM researchers also published vari-
ous properties and theorems held by this special combination of shift registers [CKM94].
The generator is demonstrated in the following figure and example.
Let LFSR A output the (binary) cycle a = a1, a2, . . . , an with period n, and LFSR B
output the cycle b = b1, b2, . . . , bm with period m. The shrinking generator combines the
LFSRs to construct a new sequence cycle z via the process shown in Figure 4.1.
LFSR A
LFSR B
If ai=1, output bj ; if ai=0, discard bj .
Figure 4.1: A Shrinking Generator Process
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Let LFSR A be of length 2 with characteristic polynomial 1 +x+ x2 and initial
sequence 10. Let LFSR B be of length 4 with characteristic polynomial 1 + x3 + x4 and
initial sequence 1100. Then LFSR A will output the sequence cycle 011 with a period
of 3, and LFSR B will output the sequence cycle 001101011110001 with a period of 15.
Thus, the output sequence cycle for this shrinking generator is z = 0101111001.
4.2 User Authentication
From the previous sections, we have seen cryptology used for transferring mes-
sages and data through given algorithms and keys. We will now cover an entirely different
use of cryptology in the way it is very commonly used today: user authentication. In
this particular section we will introduce a procedure that verifies a message that has been
received has not been altered, thus protecting and validating the integrity of the message.
We will also discuss procedures that verify that the user is who they claim to be. Both
are important and play a significant role in cryptology today.
Message Authentication Code, commonly abbreviated as MAC, runs a message
through a MAC algorithm to verify that the message is the true message that has come
from the appropriate or expected sender. We define MAC as follows:
Definition 4.1. Let M be the set of all possible messages m, K be the set of all possible
keys k, and T be the set of all possible authentication codes t. MAC is defined over
(K,M, T ) and a pair of algorithms (S, V ) so that
• S(k,m) returns a message authentication code t ∈ T , and
• V (k,m, t) returns a value true or false, depending on the correctness of the received
authentication code.
This type of verification, which requires both sender and recipient to interact, is called
a protocol. A protocol that uses a proposition of user authentication similar to MAC
is the Fiat-Shamir Protocol, devised in 1986 by mathematicians Adi Shamir and Amos
Fiat. (Shamir is also one of the founders of an algorithm we will encounter in the re-
maining sections of this chapter.) The Fiat-Shamir Protocol (FSP) is referred to as a
zero-knowledge protocol, a protocol that carries the following two conditions.
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• Both parties make random choices.
• The probability of impersonating and deceiving the other party is related to the
number of times we repeat the process. The probability is cut in half each time.
Some observations of the FSP that were suggested by Albrecht Beautelspacher
in his text Cryptology are [Beu94]:
• Few modulo n computations are needed.
• The verifier will eventually catch on that the “user” is not the expected user, since
the probability of impersonating the appropriate user successfully is (1/2)t, with t
representing the number of times the FSP is carried out. After twenty rounds of
the protocol, the probability is less than one in one million.
• After the process, the computer has learned nothing about the user’s secret.
Now that we have defined some underlying features of the FSP, we can look at the com-
plete process [Bar02]. We note that in real implementations, steps such as generating
random numbers are automated in hardware or software; these are not usually decided
by participants themselves.
Setup:
1. Verifier: selects two large prime numbers p and q, calculates n = pq, publishes n,
and keeps p and q a secret.
2. User: selects a number s in the range 1 to n − 1 that is relatively prime to n,
calculates v = s2 mod n, registers v as their public identification, sends v to the
verifier, and keeps the password s a secret.
Verifying the User (One Round of the FSP):
1. At a remote site from which the user wishes to log in, the user first generates a
number r at random in the range 1 to n − 1, and calculates w = r2 mod n. The
user then sends w to the verifier.
2. On receiving w, the verifier randomly selects a bit e, either 0 or 1, and sends e to
the user.
31
3. On receiving e, the user calculates y = r · se mod n. (If e = 0, then y = r; if e = 1,
then y = r · s mod n.) The user sends y to the verifier.
4. Receiving y, the verifier calculates
z = y2 mod n
and
z′ = w · ve mod n.
If z 6= z′, the verifier refuses the login. If z = z′, the verifier accepts that round of
the protocol and might decide to start the entire process over again to ensure that
it is the appropriate user.
Since this process works well if p and q are large blum integers, numbers of the
form 4t+3, it is difficult to calculate what p and q might be, confirming that the FSP is a
very efficient way to verify a user. However, because of the back–and–forth steps between
the user and verifier, many might think of this process as a lengthy one. The next section
will discuss the concept of shared and public keys, and of course the advantages and
disadvantages of their application.
4.3 Public-Key Cryptosystems
So far we have introduced concepts in cryptology that require a mutual knowl-
edge of a key between both sender and receiver. We will now consider the possibility of
a third party always intercepting a cryptic exchange of private information. Public-key
cryptology (which we will refer to as PKC ), is a system of cryptology that consists of an
asymmetric cipher used by both parties that allows each participant to create a public
encryption key and a private decryption key [Sin99]. One particular cryptologist who was
very interested in this concept, and thus became one of the first and biggest contributors
to PKC, is Whitfield Diffie.
Diffie’s concern about information security began when the very first forms of the
internet were being established. He presented his idea of two parties securely exchanging
their keys to IBM’s Thomas J. Watson’s Laboratory in 1974. Though the audience was
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skeptical about Diffie’s prospects, Diffie found that another person had recently presented
the same ideas he had in mind. Diffie immediately sought and united with this speaker,
Martin Hellman, thus forming one of the most dynamic partnerships in cryptography
[Sin99].
Diffie and Hellman’s solution to the key exchange problem, consisting of simple
modular arithmetic, is called the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The idea was first pub-
lished in an article titled New Directions in Cryptography in 1976. The Diffie-Hellman
key exchange consists solely of the distribution of a key between both parties without the
third party obtaining a copy of the key. Thus, this protocol cannot be used to encrypt
and decrypt messages.
For this protocol, Diffie thought of using the discrete logarithm to tie his idea
together. The discrete logarithm revolves around solving for x such that ax ≡ b (mod p),
where p is a prime integer, and a, b are nonzero positive integers. This protocol begins
with two people we will encounter again in the RSA section: Alice and Bob. As the
exchange of information is happening between Alice and Bob, we have Eve who is always
intercepting the conversation. The protocol goes as follows [Sch94]:
1. First, Alice and Bob each agree on large integers, n and g, such that 1 < g < n.
(These two integers do not have to be secret.)
2. Alice chooses a random large integer x, which she will keep private, and computes
X = gx mod n.
3. Bob chooses a random large integer y, which he will keep private, and computes
Y = gy mod n.
4. Alice sends X to Bob, and Bob sends Y to Alice (without giving away x or y).
5. Alice computes k = Y x mod n and Bob computes k′ = Xy mod n.
Two conditions that improve efficiency of this protocol are:
• The modulus n should be a prime, and large; at least 512 bits long, and
• g should be a primitive root (mod n).
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If a third person, say Carol, were to be included, the process would just depend on
adding one more value for computation, with g and n holding the same properties as
before [Sch94]:
1. Alice chooses a random large integer x and computes X = gx mod n.
2. Bob chooses a random large integer y and computes Y = gy mod n.
3. Carol chooses a random large integer z and computes Z = gz mod n.
4. Alice sends X to Bob, Bob sends Y to Carol, and Carol sends Z to Alice.
5. Alice computes Ẑ = Zx mod n.
6. Bob computes X̂ = Xy mod n.
7. Carol computes Ŷ = Y z mod n.
8. Alice sends Ẑ to Bob, Bob sends X̂ to Carol, and Carol sends Ŷ to Alice. (Since
there is an extra person, an extra round of computations needs to be done so that
each person is able to get a copy of the key.)
9. Alice computes k = Ŷ x mod n.
10. Bob computes k = Ẑy mod n.
11. Carol computes k = X̂z mod n.
The obtained key, k, the mutual secret key between all 3 parties, is also equiv-
alent to gxyz mod n, and no eavesdropper can obtain or compute k, since the shared key
is derived from a combination of each party’s secret number. After obtaining k, Alice,
Bob, and Carol can start encrypting and decrypting using k. Unless k is a very small
number, it will be difficult for Eve to decipher any messages that are transferred between
Alice, Bob, and Carol.
One question that might arise over this key exchange process is: How do Alice
and Bob know what to do if they have never met? It must be assumed that Alice and
Bob know the steps to deriving the key. Another question might be: How do they agree
on an encryption process (since there are hundreds), without Eve finding out? It also
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must be assumed that both parties know beforehand what method for encryption and
decryption will be used after obtaining k.
After this breakthrough in cryptology, Diffie still had other things in mind; the
thought of an asymmetric cipher was perplexing. The idea was to suppose Alice had a
key that is solely used for encryption, but to decrypt, a different key is required. Diffie
thought of this cipher as a form of computer encryption, so both keys would be two
different numbers such that one would be private, known only to Alice, and the other
would be public. Alice’s private key is the decryption key, while her public key, to which
everyone has access, is her encryption key. Alice publishes her encryption key so that
everyone has access to it; if someone uses the encryption key to encrypt a message and
send it to Alice, Alice can use her private key to decrypt the message.
The advantage of this system is that there is no time spent performing calcula-
tions to derive a mutual secret key. Two keys are required for each person who wishes to
participate in the exchange of messages. After much effort to translate this idea into a
workable cryptographic system, neither Diffie, Hellman, nor Ralph Merkle (a UC Berke-
ley graduate student that had become part of the Diffie-Hellman team), could derive
an appropriate mathematical function. The race to find an asymmetric cipher for this
idea was won by another trio of cryptology researchers: Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman [Sin99].
4.4 The RSA Algorithm
Ronald Rivest was the first of the trio to stumble upon Diffie and Hellman’s
concept of asymmetric ciphers. Rivest persuaded two fellow MIT researchers, Leonard
Adleman and Adi Shamir, that there might be some interesting mathematics in the
problem [Sin99]. After spending months coming up with a one-way function (a function
in which it is easy to go in one direction, but difficult to reverse the procedure), that
satisfied the concept of an asymmetric cipher, Rivest made a breakthrough and presented
it to his two colleagues. Shamir and Adleman could not find a flaw in Rivest’s work, thus
they felt their research was complete. (This does not necessarily mean that there is not
a flaw in the RSA system; it has yet to be proven as foolproof.)
Typically, a theorem or algorithm that has multiple founders is named by the
founders in alphabetical order. However, Adleman insisted that his name not be included
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in the discovery the three had reached. Rivest disregarded this, including Adleman any-
way, and dubbed the cipher RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) [Sin99].
Before introducing the RSA cryptosystem itself, we must first examine a few
of the building blocks upon which RSA heavily relies. Since the RSA algorithm is a
direct application of Euler’s theorem, we will show the necessary definitions and steps for
deriving this theorem [Beu94].
For a natural number n, we define φ(n) to be the number of positive integers
less than n that are relatively prime (sharing no common factor besides 1) to n. As an
example, if n = 6, then all the positive integers smaller than n are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Since 1
and 5 are the only numbers in this group relatively prime to 6, φ(6) = 2. Using this
definition, we can validate the following claims:
1. If p denotes a prime number, then φ(p) = p− 1.
This claim follows immediately since 1, 2, 3, ..., p− 1 are relatively prime to p.
2. If p and q are two distinct primes, then φ(pq) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
We know there is a total of pq− 1 positive integers smaller than pq. We count how
many of them are not relatively prime to pq. So, we consider the multiples of p less
than pq: p, 2p, 3p, ..., (q−1)p, and the multiples of q less than pq: q, 2q, 3q, ..., (p−1)q.
Since these are the only integers between 1 and pq− 1 that are not relatively prime
to pq, it follows that
φ(pq) = pq − 1− (q − 1)− (p− 1)
= pq − q − p+ 1
= (p− 1)(q − 1).
Thus, we are able to formulate Euler’s theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Euler’s Theorem
Let m and n be two relatively prime positive integers. Then mφ(n) (mod n) ≡ 1,
where n is the product of two distinct primes. As we consider the second claim mentioned
above, we conclude that m(p−1)(q−1) (mod pq) ≡ 1, where m is relatively prime to both p
and q, which are both distinct prime numbers.
Euler’s theorem is a specific case from the following theorem, where k = 1:
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Theorem 4.3. Let p and q be distinct primes.
(1) If a is relatively prime to pq, then
ak(p−1)(q−1) ≡ 1 (mod pq),
where k is any integer.
(2) For any integer a,
ak(p−1)(q−1)+1 ≡ a (mod pq),
where k is any positive integer.
Another concept that is very helpful when applying RSA is the Euclidean al-
gorithm. This algorithm makes it easy to produce the private and public key of any
participant. Euclid described this algorithm in his book, Elements (Book 7, Proposition
1 & 2), written around 300 B.C. However, historians believe the algorithm existed years
earlier [Sch94].
The objective of the Euclidean algorithm is to compute the greatest common
divisor of two given positive integers a and b, where a ≥ b. With two reasonably small
numbers, we can determine the greatest common divisor by factoring. However, to save
time and tedious work, this algorithm makes it easier to calculate the greatest common
divisor of two very large numbers.
The algorithm works by taking the larger number a, and dividing it by the
smaller number b, which does not take too much effort. We then divide b by the remain-
der from the previous step, and the process repeats, until no remainder is left.
The following definition of Euclid’s algorithm comes from Donald Knuth’s text [Knu97]:
Definition 4.4. (Euclid’s Algorithm).
Given two positive integers m and n, find their greatest common divisor, that is, the
largest positive integer that evenly divides both m and n.
1. Find Remainder: Divide m by n and let r be the remainder. (We will have 0 ≤ r <
n.)
2. Is r = 0?: If r = 0, the algorithm terminates; n is the greatest common divisor.
3. Reduce: Set m← n, n← r, and go back to Step 1.
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The proof for this algorithm can be found in [Knu97].
Let us consider an example from [Beu94], where we compute the greatest common divisor
of a and b, where a = 792 and b = 75:
Example 4.4.1. Applying the Euclidean Algorithm
792 = 10 · 75 + 42
75 = 1 · 42 + 33
42 = 1 · 33 + 9
33 = 3 · 9 + 6
9 = 1 · 6 + 3
6 = 2 · 3 + 0.
By the Euclidean algorithm, 3 is the greatest common divisor of 792 and 75.
Since we have described the two concepts that are necessary for applying the RSA algo-
rithm, we may proceed by defining the steps of the RSA cryptosystem.
The RSA Cryptosystem [Mao04]:
Key Setup
To set up Alice’s key, Alice preforms the following steps.
1. Choose two large, random prime numbers p and q such that |p| ≈ |q|.
2. Compute n = pq.
3. Compute φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
4. Choose a random integer e < φ(n) such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, and compute an
integer d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)).
5. Publish (n, e) as the public key, safely destroy p, q, and φ(n), and keep d as the
private key.
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Encryption
To send a confidential message m < n to Alice, the sender Bob creates the ciphertext c
as follows: c← me mod n.
Decryption
To decrypt the ciphertext c, Alice computes: m← cd mod n.
The question arises: How do we know that the m we get after decryption will be
the same m that was encrypted? We present the proof of why RSA works using Theorem
(4.3) [Bar02]:
Proof. In this proof, we will have m represent the product of the two primes, and x be
the message Bob wants to send to Alice. To prepare for receiving encrypted messages,
Alice selects two prime numbers p and q and calculates
m = pq and n = (p− 1)(q − 1).
Next, she selects another number e that is relatively prime to n. She then uses the
Eucldean algorithm to find d such that e · d ≡ 1 (mod n). Alice broadcasts e and m.
Now, if Bob wants to send x to Alice, with x in the range 0 to m − 1, he calculates the
corresponding ciphertext as
y = xe mod m.
Bob sends y to Alice. Upon receiving y, Alice calculates
yd mod m.
Now, by the definition of y, this gives
yd ≡ (xe mod m)d
≡ (xe)d
≡ xed (mod m).
Since d ≡ e−1 (mod n), by the definition of multiplicative inverse modulo n we know
that d · e = 1 + kn = 1 + k(p− 1)(q − 1) for some integer k. So by Theorem (4.3),
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yd ≡ xed ≡ x1+k(p−1)(q−1) ≡ x (mod n).
That is, Alice recovers Bob’s original message.
The following is a straightforward example using RSA that Wenbo Mao provides in his
text Modern Cryptology: Theory & Practice:
Example 4.4.2.
Let Alice set n = 7 · 13 = 91 and e = 5. Then φ(n) = 6 · 12 = 72. After applying the
Euclidean algorithm, Alice derives 5 · 29 ≡ 1 (mod 72). Therefore, 29 will be Alice’s key
for decryption. She publishes (n, e) = (91, 5) as her public key.
Now, let Bob encrypt a plaintext m = 3. So Bob encrypts m by computing
c = 35 = 243 ≡ 61 (mod 91).
Therefore the resulting ciphertext message is 61. To decrypt this ciphertext, Alice com-
putes
6129 mod 91 = 3,
thus retrieving the original plaintext, 3.
RSA gets its security from the difficulty of factoring large numbers whose factors
alone consist of at least 100 to 200 digits [Sch94]. To ensure maximum security in our
cryptosystem, we consider two conditions [Sch94]:
• A common modulus should not be used.
• The exponents chosen should not be small.
There are many interpretations of the RSA algorithm that other cryptologists
or cryptology enthusiasts have created, including the RSA key exchange, the Rabin Cryp-
tosystem, and the ElGamal Cryptosystem (which is more of an application of the Diffie-
Hellman Key exchange). There are also many current applications that strongly rely on
the RSA algorithm, mainly internet security.
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4.5 An Insecure Public-key Cryptosystem: The Knapsack
Cryptosystem
As the Diffie-Hellman algorithm was just starting to be recognized for its in-
novation in cryptology, Ralph Merkle had been working on another public key approach
[Lev01]. The system Merkle had in mind was built around a mathematical problem known
as a knapsack problem. In general, one solves the knapsack problem by finding a way to
optimally fill the knapsack. One looks for a way to select the “best” items to put in the
knapsack in such a way that the knapsack becomes neither overfilled nor underfilled.
Merkle had envisioned this system by considering a trapdoor one-way function
where the right person could easily obtain the solution, but it would remain exceedingly
difficult for other parties to do so. Merkle had worked with Marty Hellman to devise such
a system. To ensure that this cryptosystem would be secure, Merkle posted a challenge
on his office door offering $100 to the first person to break it. The first person to break the
“easier” version of the challenge, a single-iteration knapsack scheme, was one of the RSA
founders, Leonard Adleman. Merkle then decided to offer $1000 to decode a multiple-
iteration knapsack. In just after two years, Merkle wrote a check to researcher Ernie
Brickell from Sandia National Laboratory [Lev01].
The knapsack problem may be stated as follows [Bur11]: Given a knapsack of
volume V and n items of various volumes a1, a2, ..., an, we want to see if there exists a
subset of these items that will completely fill the knapsack. An alternative formulation:
For positive integers a1, a2, ..., an, and a sum V , solve the equation
V = a1x1 + a2x2 + ...+ anxn,
where xi = 0 or 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The number of possible solutions depends on the
choice of the sequence a1, a2, ..., an and the integer V . For example [Bur11], the knapsack
problem
22 = 3x1 + 7x2 + 9x3 + 11x4 + 20x5
is not solvable, but the problem
27 = 3x1 + 7x2 + 9x3 + 11x4 + 20x5
has two distinct solutions:
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x2 = x3 = x4 = 1; x1 = x5 = 0
and
x2 = x5 = 1; x1 = x3 = x4 = 0.
These are straightforward examples, but finding a solution to a randomly chosen knapsack
problem may be much more difficult. We may choose to conduct an exhaustive direct
search by testing all 2n possibilities for x1, x2, ..., xn, but this method becomes impractical
for n greater than 100. However, what if the sequence of integers a1, a2, ..., an has a special
property? A property that makes the knapsack problem much easier to solve is to use a
superincreasing sequence a1, a2, ..., an. Such a sequence is defined by the property that
ai > a1 + a2 + ...+ ai−1, i = 2, 3, ..., n.
Knapsack problems based on superincreasing sequences are uniquely solvable, if there
exists a solution at all. We observe this in the following example [Bur11]:
Example 4.5.1.
Solving the superincreasing knapsack problem:
28 = 3x1 + 5x2 + 11x3 + 20x4 + 41x5.
We apply the following steps starting with the largest coefficient in this equation: 41.
1. Since 41 > 28, it cannot be part of our subset sum; hence x5 = 0.
2. We then consider the next largest coefficient: 20. Now 20 < 28, and the sum of
preceding coefficients is 3 + 5 + 11 < 28, so these 3 items alone cannot fill the
knapsack; therefore 20 must be included in the sum, and so x4 = 1.
3. Since x4 = 1 and x5 = 0, we may substitute these values into the equation to obtain:
28 = 3x1 + 5x2 + 11x3 + 20(1) + 41(0)
28 = 3x1 + 5x2 + 11x3 + 20
8 = 3x1 + 5x2 + 11x3.
Repeating Step 1: Since 11 > 8, x3 = 0, thus reducing our equation to 8 = 3x1 +
5x2, which has an obvious unique solution: x1 = x2 = 1. This identifies the subset of
{3, 5, 11, 20, 41} having the desired sum:
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28 = 3 + 5 + 20.
A generalization of this process may be defined as follows [Bur11]. Suppose that we wish
to solve the knapsack problem
V = a1x1 + a2x2 + ...+ anxn,
where a1, a2, ..., an is a superincreasing sequence of integers. Assume that V can be
obtained by using some subset of the sequence, so, in particular, V is not larger than the
sum a1 + a2 + ... + an. Working from right to left in the sequence, we begin by letting
xn = 1 if V ≥ an, and xn = 0 if v < an. Then obtain xn−1, xn−2, ..., x1, in turn, by
choosing
xi =
1 if V − (ai+1xi+1 + ...+ anxn) ≥ ai,0 if V − (ai+1xi+1 + ...+ anxn) < ai.
Note that any solution obtained from this procedure must be unique.
The application of knapsacks in Merkle and Hellman’s cryptosystem functions
as follows:
Setting up the public key for a sender to use
1. A user starts by choosing a superincreasing sequence a1, a2, ..., an.
2. The user selects a modulus m > 2an and a multiplier a, with 0 < a < m and
gcd(a,m) = 1. This property ensures that the congruence ax ≡ 1 (mod m) has a
unique solution, say x = c mod m.
3. The user forms the sequence of integers b1, b2, ..., bn defined by
bi ≡ aai (mod m), i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where 0 < bi < m. Carrying out this last transformation destroys the superincreas-
ing property we saw in ai.
4. The user keeps secret the original sequence a1, a2, ..., an, and the numbers m and
a, but publicizes b1, b2, ..., bn in a public directory.
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A sender using the public key bi to encrypt a message and send to the user
1. A sender must use the bi’s as the encryption key in order to send the user a message.
The sender begins by converting their plaintext message into a string M of 0’s and
1’s using the binary equivalent of letters (see Fig. 4.1).
2. The string is then split into blocks of n binary digits, with the last block being filled
with 1’s at the end, if necessary.
3. The public encrypting sequence b1, b2, ..., bn is next used to transform a given plain-
text block, say x1, x2, ..., xn, into the sum
S = b1x1 + b2x2 + ...+ bnxn. (4.1)
The number S is then sent to the user over a communication channel, which is
presumed to be insecure.
The user decrypts S
Recall that c is a number such that ac ≡ 1 (mod m). Knowing c and m, the user derives
S′ = cS mod m. (4.2)
Using (4.1) to expand the above congruence, we obtain
S′ = cb1x1 + cb2x2 + ...+ cbnxn mod m
= caa1x1 + caa2x2 + ...+ caanxn mod m.
Now ca ≡ 1 (mod m), therefore the last congruence simplifies to
S′ = a1x1 + a2x2 + ...+ anxn mod m.
Because m > 2an > a1 + a2 + ... + an, we obtain a1x1 + a2x2 + ... + anxn < m; and in
light of the condition 0 ≤ S′ < m, the equality
S′ = a1x1 + a2x2 + ...+ anxn
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must hold. Thus, the solution to this superincreasing knapsack problem leads us to the
solution of the more difficult problem (4.1), and the plaintext block x1, x2, ..., xn of n
digits is thereby recovered from S. Let us consider a small-scale example with n = 5.
Example 4.5.2.
Recall the important conditions for a and m: m > 2an; 0 < a < m; and gcd(a,m) = 1.
Since n = 5 for this example, user A may select the superincreasing sequence {ai} =
{3, 5, 11, 20, 41}, and choose the multiplier a = 44 and the modulus m = 85. Each
ai is then multiplied by 44 and reduced modulo 85, yielding the public key sequence
{bi} = {47, 50, 59, 30, 19}. Sender B wants to send the message UNITE to User A. (For
this example, we will convert these letters into a smaller binary representation than ASCII
code format for the sake of conciseness.) Sender B converts his plaintext into the following
string of 0’s and 1’s:
M = 10100 01101 01000 10011 00100
The string is then divided into blocks of digits, in the current case, blocks of length 5
(since each binary form of the plaintext letters is of length 5), and multiplied with the
binary digits that are part of the binary representations of the plaintext letters. Using
the public key to encrypt, the sender transforms the successive blocks (containing our
plaintext in binary form) into:
106 = 47 · 1 + 50 · 0 + 59 · 1 + 30 · 0 + 19 · 0
128 = 47 · 0 + 50 · 1 + 59 · 1 + 30 · 0 + 19 · 1
50 = 47 · 0 + 50 · 1 + 59 · 0 + 30 · 0 + 19 · 0
96 = 47 · 1 + 50 · 0 + 59 · 0 + 30 · 1 + 19 · 1
59 = 47 · 0 + 50 · 0 + 59 · 1 + 30 · 0 + 19 · 0
Thus the transmitted ciphertext is
106 128 50 96 59.
User A is able to decrypt the sequence by first solving the congruence
44x ≡ 1 (mod 85),
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yielding x ≡ 29 (mod 85). Then each ciphertext number is multiplied by 29 and reduced
modulo 85, to produce a superincreasing knapsack problem. For instance, 50 is converted
to 5, because 50 · 29 ≡ 5 (mod 85). The corresponding knapsack problem is
5 = 3x1 + 5x2 + 11x3 + 20x4 + 41x5,
which has the unique solution x2 = 1, x1 = x3 = x4 = x5 = 0. User A repeats this
process by multiplying all ciphertext numbers by 29 and reducing modulo 85 to obtain a
superincreasing knapsack problem for each item in the ciphertext.
One might already feel that this cryptosystem is a bit insecure, for the only
possible combinations of xi’s for the third and fifth number in our ciphertext are 01000
and 00100, thus revealing that the letters must be I and E. We see that it is easy for
an outside party to decrypt a letter if one of the public bi’s appears as a number in the
transmitted ciphertext. An outside party might also be able to decrypt more letters by
exhausting all possible combinations by considering the properties of adding even and
odd integers. For example, let us look at
128 = 47 · 0 + 50 · 1 + 59 · 1 + 30 · 0 + 19 · 1,
which is known only to Sender B. An outside party that is trying to see the message being
sent to User A would see only
128 = 47x1 + 50x2 + 59x3 + 30x4 + 19x5,
and may try to decrypt xi by a brute force attack as follows. Let us represent an even
number by E, and an odd number by O. Since 128 is an even number, we know that the
possible combinations of even and odd numbers that sum to 128, an even number, are
E = E
E = E + E
E = O +O
E = E + E + E
E = O +O + E
E = O +O + E + E
E = E + E + E + E
E = O +O +O +O
E = E + E + E + E + E
E = O +O + E + E + E
E = O +O +O +O + E.
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We eliminate some combinations since we see that we have 3 odd coefficients and
2 even coefficients in our equation. Thus, the only possible combinations left to consider
are
128 = E + E
= O +O
= O +O + E
= O +O + E + E.
The first combination will not work since the sum of the even coefficients is 80. Thus, by
exhausting all remaining combinations, we obtain the correct combination:
128 = 50 + 59 + 19.
Thus, the xi sequence for this equation must be 01101. This technique of exhausting
all possible combinations of 0’s and 1’s for all xi enables an outside party to attack the
ciphertext with ease! If n is relatively large, then a computer might be able to perform
this or any other method of exhaustion faster than the time it takes for one to select a
superincreasing sequence. A more secure example where n = 10 can be found in [Bur11].
Many variations of the Merkle-Hellman scheme have been created; however,
most have been proven to be insecure and thus not very useful for current means of
cryptology.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we learned of different ciphers, methods of encryption
and decryption, and a brief history of each concept. We began by introducing one of
the earliest known ciphers, the Caesar cipher. Both the Caesar cipher and the more
complicated affine cipher can be deciphered by applying frequency analysis. Frequency
analysis, as we learned, is an important technique that can be used in some way to
decipher many ciphers, mono and polyalphabetic. Polyalphabetic ciphers were created
in order to provide better security than the various, and once popular, monoalphabetic
ciphers. We discussed a few polyalphabetic ciphers and techniques to decipher them, but
mainly considered the famous Vigene`re cipher. Chapter 3 also included a discussion of
William Friedman and his many successes and contributions to cryptology. We ended
this chapter with other significant classical ciphers that one might find interesting.
Chapter 4 introduced cryptology used in the ever growing era of computers.
Instead of making up a key and having our key be vulnerable to attacks, shift registers
allow pseudorandom keys to be created and incorporated into the cipher. However, there
are a few ways one can work backwards to derive the shift register. (Section 4.1 presents
only one of these ways.) In Section 4.2 we discussed user authentication, an application of
cryptology that is used to verify a user. This application of cryptology (that is the basis
of many protocols and ciphers) has allowed small-time cryptologists to think outside of
the box and consider the vast possibilities of cryptology.
We concluded this paper with the most significant breakthrough in cryptology:
public-key cryptosystems. Whitfield Diffie’s contributions to public-key cryptography
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were fortuitous and revolutionary. Steven Levy writes in his book Crypto [Lev01], “For
the first time, it became possible to conceive of all sorts of official transactions–contracts,
receipts, and the like–to be performed over computer networks, with no need for one’s
physical presence.” Cryptology was no longer limited to the government; Diffie had made
it possible for anyone to be protected with encryption while performing commercial trans-
actions. Aside from the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Diffie was able to formulate the
concept of the RSA algorithm and inspire the founders to seek and discover a mathemat-
ical representation of Diffie’s idea. The RSA algorithm opened up more possibilities for
computer security and for cryptology iteself.
The last public-key cryptosystem we discussed was one of many insecure cryp-
tosystems created: the knapsack cryptosystem. Studying this cryptosystem leaves many
unanswered questions for cryptology enthusiasts alike: Could a definite secure cryptosys-
tem be created based on this concept? Might other factors be put into consideration
when deriving a public key? We were able to present one of the many methods of attack
on a ciphertext encrypted under the knapsack cryptosystem.
In response to these new breakthroughs, colleges have been able to implement
modern and public-key cryptology into their curriculum. However, cryptology is usually
not a required course, and only available as an elective in some schools. Learning it on
one’s own is possible, but may require some patience and many sources for various expla-
nations. Learning the many forms of cryptology, and how it has evolved through time,
shows how fast we are advancing in technology and in our problem solving techniques.
Cryptology is a part of mathematical and world history, and has given humanity some
control over what is rightfully ours: our secrets.
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